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THE PREDICTIVE BRAIN
In a very broad sense, predictive processing refers to any type of 
processing which incorporates or generates not just information 
about the past or the present, but also future states of the body or 
the environment. Such directedness towards the future has long 
been recognized as relevant and beneﬁ  cial for different aspects 
of information processing, such as perception, motor and cogni-
tive control, decision making, theory of mind and other cogni-
tive processes in humans as well as, in a more rudimentary form, 
animals. Historically, the investigation of anticipatory mechanisms 
and representations started almost in parallel in the contexts of 
perceptual and motor processing. One of the ﬁ  rst proposals that 
expectations are intrinsically related to actions was formulated in 
the 19th century within the ideomotor principle which has recently 
been revisited by theories suggesting the existence of shared or 
common codes between perception and action (James, 1890; Prinz, 
1990; Hommel et al., 2001; Stock and Stock, 2004). Several dec-
ades later, similar ideas emphasizing a close interaction between 
sensory and motor processing have been suggested within the ﬁ  eld 
of motor control. This was primarily motivated by initial inves-
tigations aimed at resolving a very fundamental question of how 
our visual world remains stabile despite constant image displace-
ment introduced by eye and head movements. Early in the 20th 
century, Mach and Uexkuell offered a theoretical solution to this 
question which suggested that motor activity directly inﬂ  uences 
sensory processing, an idea which was already present in the think-
ing of Bell, Purkinje and von Helmholtz (Bridgeman, 2007). This 
was experimentally conﬁ  rmed in 1950 when the terms “efference 
copy” and “corollary discharge”, concepts which are today widely 
accepted in the context of forward models in the motor and other 
INTRODUCTION
In 1637 the Art of Worldly Wisdom taught us that “even knowledge 
has to be in the fashion” (Gracian, 1991). The experience of working 
in neurosciences similarly illustrates that different times bring dif-
ferent research areas to the front, and these, in turn, promote certain 
concepts and ideas that draw a lot of attention and drive the ﬁ  eld 
for a certain period of time. Such “knowledge in fashion” typically 
fundamentally changes the way we conceptualize cognitive and 
neural processing by opening new paradigms, new interpretations 
and new perspectives. We suggest that the concept of a predictive 
brain can be considered as somewhat “in fashion” at the moment. 
It is an old idea being brought back to life in numerous areas of 
research where it is triggering small or larger-scale paradigm shifts. 
Terms such as prediction, prospection, anticipation, expectation, 
preparation as well as violations of expectations or prediction errors 
are being more and more present and exploited in our daily science. 
And, yet, although many researchers agree when emphasizing the 
pivotal role of prediction in both cognitive and neural process-
ing, few would show the same level of concurrence with respect 
to the endorsed terminology, deﬁ  nitions, exemplary phenomena 
considered representative for such processing or the mechanisms 
suggested to underlie their occurrence. In fact, while some views 
and frameworks which have been put forward within this ﬁ  eld can 
be considered mutually independent, others could be described 
as complimentary or occasionally even opposing. Therefore, it is 
of relevance to try and mutually compare these different views as 
this may reveal not just the widely emphasized and agreed-upon 
beneﬁ  ts of predictive processing, but also differences or even incon-
sistencies between approaches as well as the open questions which 
remain to be addressed within this ﬁ  eld.
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cognitive domains, have been ﬁ  rst introduced (Grüsser, 1995). 
While these approaches postulated how action selection depends 
on anticipated action outcomes and demonstrated how motor 
commands can be directly incorporated into sensory processes, 
early psychological experiments conducted by Wundt, Lange and 
James demonstrated how executing such actions becomes more 
efﬁ  cient when these are based on appropriate perceptual expec-
tations (LaBerge, 1995). In this view anticipation was treated as 
a form of attention which was regarded beneﬁ  cial as it allowed 
more pertinent reactions in the immediate situation. James even 
conceptualized sensory anticipation as “pre-perception” of an 
event, given that it reﬂ  ects the pre-activation of relevant brain 
structures which reduces the need for very elaborate processing 
following the actual event presentation (James, 1890). In addition 
to this, the current research on prediction in perception has been 
greatly inﬂ  uenced by von Helmholtz who argued that sensory 
systems evolved in order to infer the causes of changes in sensory 
inputs (Friston and Stephan, 2007), thus equating perception 
with recognition, namely inference about the state of the world. 
Although it is theoretically conceivable that such inference could 
be accomplished though different types of computations, it has 
lately been demonstrated that it, in fact, incorporates predictive 
mechanisms supported by recurrent neural processing (Friston 
et al., 2006; Bar, 2007). During the early decades of psychological 
research the importance of expectations was also emphasized for 
other cognitive functions such as, e.g., learning (Tolman, 1948) as 
well as behavioral sequencing, namely serial ordering of behavior 
across different hierarchical levels (Lashley, 1951).
Although suggestions regarding the importance of predictive 
mechanisms originate from very early phases of both psychol-
ogy and neurosciences, until recently they have not been strongly 
advocated in the majority of frameworks of cognitive and neural 
processing. Speciﬁ  cally, typical approaches in delineating cognitive 
processes postulate a rather serial process, starting with sensory, 
continuing with executive and “higher cognitive” functions and 
ending in overt behavior. Such thinking stems from the original 
behaviorist conceptualizations which emphasized the linear pro-
gression from sensory stimulation to overt behavior, a view which 
was also present in early information-processing cognitivist theo-
ries. And, even though the extreme behaviorist stimulus–response 
view of human behavior is today rarely or almost never advocated, 
different cognitive processes are today still dominantly studied in 
isolation. In addition, although rarely explicitly postulated, it is 
often assumed that a given process of interest starts with the output 
of some earlier, lower-level process and terminates once it pro-
vides input to the next processing stage. For example, one typically 
assumes that executing movements follows sensory processing and 
decision making while object recognition occurs once low-level vis-
ual processing is ﬁ  nished, providing input for higher-level cognitive 
functions. Although such hypotheses are not labeled as “reactive” 
or “non-predictive”, they are in many ways challenged by concep-
tualizations promoted by explicitly deﬁ  ned predictive frameworks. 
These introduce paradigms and ﬁ  ndings which indicate high inter-
dependence of processes which are typically investigated in isola-
tion, such as action and perception. In addition, although they do 
not question the importance of the feedforward information ﬂ  ow, 
these approaches primarily emphasize the relevance of feedback 
and recurrent processing. This does not imply that feedback or 
top-down biases represent exclusively predictive phenomena or that 
they are incompatible with more traditional views on cognitive or 
neural processing. After all, the ideas regarding constant exchange 
between incoming sensory data and existing knowledge used for 
postulating hypothesis regarding sensations have been advocated 
in the “analysis by synthesis” views formulated in the early days of 
cognitive psychology (MacKay, 1956). Regardless of this, however, 
the importance of top-down processing is emphasized much more 
within predictive approaches which often aim at determining how 
previous knowledge inﬂ  uences and guides current event process-
ing. These approaches show how, given the levels of ambiguity 
and noise which is always present both in the environment and 
our neural system, such prior biases become crucial for facilitating 
and optimizing current event processing, regardless of whether 
it concerns recognizing objects, executing movements or scaling 
emotional reactions. They allow us to act, not solely react once all 
relevant information has been presented and fully processed, by 
making predictions about what to expect next while talking into 
account the current context and previous experiences integrated 
across different timescales.
In the previous paragraph, a general predictive approach 
to cognitive and neural processing has been compared, but not 
directly contrasted with classical behaviorist and early  information-
  processing views on neural and cognitive processing. In addition 
to this, predictive frameworks can also be more directly contrasted 
with approaches which emphasize postdictive or retrospective 
processing mechanisms. Generally, such views suggest that  efﬁ  cient 
processing of events in ambiguous contexts does not need to result 
from effective preparation, but retrospective use of information 
regarding events which occurred following those of interest. 
However, although experimental evidence indicates that the brain 
uses such postdictive mechanisms in certain contexts (Whitney and 
Murakami, 1998; Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000; Enns and Lleras, 
2008), there is no uniﬁ  ed retrospective or   postdictive framework 
which may be contrasted with the predictive ones. And, although 
the suggested predictive and postdictive mechanisms represent 
mutually opposing phenomena, there is evidence that both types 
of processes may coexist in certain situations (e.g., Soga et al., 2009). 
Such contexts also clearly indicate how prediction may be dissoci-
ated from memory, a function with which it is intrinsically deeply 
related. As suggested before, prediction crucially depends on previ-
ous experience and builds on memories of various kinds. It does 
not, however, include mnemonic encoding nor can it be reduced 
to mnemonic recall. Furthermore, it does not necessarily have to 
occur in all contexts where previous experiences are available for 
generating expectations about the future. In contrast, predictive 
processes cooperate and actively build on mnemonic ones and, in 
that sense, help to generate goal-directed and adapted behavior.
MANY TERMS, HOW MANY MEANINGS?
All throughout the history of cognitive (neuro)science, different 
terms, e.g., anticipation, expectation, prediction, prospection or 
preparation, have been used with respect to predictive process-
ing. Although these do not necessarily transmit the same meaning, 
they are rarely clearly differentiated. For example, LaBerge (1995) 
deﬁ  ned the terms “anticipation” or “preparation” as elevated levels Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March  2010 | Volume  4 | Article  25 | 3
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of processing in sensory or motor areas occurring prior and facili-
tating the processing of the expected perceptual or motor event. In 
contrast, the term “expectation” reﬂ  ects a memory component as 
it refers to an item stored in either working or long-term memory 
which includes the information regarding the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of the expected event (LaBerge, 1995). Given that 
such representations can also be coded in rather abstract or ver-
bal forms they do not necessarily presuppose a pre-activation of 
the relevant sensory cortices. A somewhat different distinction is 
offered by Butz et al. (2003) who compared the usage of the terms 
anticipation and prediction. According to this view, these terms 
convey partially different meanings: while prediction refers to a 
representation of an event (potentially comparable to the previ-
ous speciﬁ  cation of the term expectation), anticipation describes 
the impact of predictions on current behavior, e.g., decisions and 
actions based on such predictions. Even though not completely 
speciﬁ  ed, these are still somewhat more clearly deﬁ  ned when com-
pared to the widely used term “prospection”. Gilbert and Wilson 
(2007, p. 1352) deﬁ  ne prospection as an ability to “pre-experience 
the future by simulating it in our minds” which may, however, 
lack the detail and richness of genuine perceptions. Given that 
these simulations often do not mimic events of interest in a very 
reliable and realistic fashion, they are prone to errors which reﬂ  ect 
mistakes in representing the context or content of simulated events. 
For example, such simulations are typically shortened and essen-
tialized when compared to real events. In addition, while often 
being based on speciﬁ  c exemplars which are not representative for 
the target scenario, they also tend to be run in a comparative and 
decontextualized manner (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007, 2009). Thus, 
although prospection can include some aspects of both expecta-
tion and anticipation, it is not clearly speciﬁ  ed in which extent 
and under which conditions. Therefore, this term is more suited 
to refer to a more general orientation towards the future in a sense 
that stored information is constantly used to imagine, simulate 
and predict future events (Schacter et al., 2007). This speciﬁ  ca-
tion may, however, not be quite in line with the view endorsed by 
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007) who deﬁ  ne prospective codes 
in event production and simulation as representations of present 
events which contain information pertaining to their future effects 
or goals. In this sense, prospective codes describe speciﬁ  c effects 
associated with a certain event and are therefore similar to the 
previous speciﬁ  cation of expectations. However, prospective coding 
as used in this context should not be confused with the account of 
predictive coding which describes how causes are mapped to their 
sensory expressions (e.g., motor command to sensory consequences 
of such a command), a process not necessarily synonymous with 
forecasting (Friston et al., 2006; Kilner et al., 2007).
In addition, although some aspects of predictive processing have 
traditionally been regarded as speciﬁ  c forms of attention, it has 
recently been suggested that these represent fully distinct phenom-
ena in the sense that expectations guide visual processing based on 
prior likelihood in contrast to attention which prioritizes sensory 
processing based on the motivational relevance of presented stimuli 
(Summerﬁ  eld and Egner, 2009). Although appealing, such separa-
tion may not be warranted as attention uniﬁ  es a broad range of phe-
nomena aimed not just at selecting motivationally relevant stimuli, 
but also maintaining relevant activity and, importantly, preparing 
for the incoming events (LaBerge, 1995). Such broad conceptuali-
zation is not just a historical relict, but also reﬂ  ects the fact that 
all described phenomena [selective attention, sustained attention 
(vigilance) as well as preparation], reﬂ  ect focusing or enhancing 
the processing of currently relevant information in contrast to, 
e.g., arousal or alertness which represent non-speciﬁ  c activation 
phenomena (Oken et al., 2006). Therefore, when comparing the 
terms prediction and attention, it may be of use to clearly specify 
the aspect of attentive processing to which predictive processing is 
being compared. Among these different aspects, selective attention 
bears the most similarity with prediction and these can partly over-
lap in some underlying neural mechanisms, although they may also 
be characterized by different temporal course, type of information 
used for biasing information processing or other features.
In summary, although a wide range of terms exist for describ-
ing the basic phenomenon of foresight, these are not consistently 
used and are often interchanged. This is somewhat problematic, as 
the lack of systematization in terminology may become reﬂ  ected 
in the lack of systematization in understanding the phenomenon 
of interest. Overall, there seems to be an agreement that the term 
expectation describes the representations of what is predicted to 
occur in the future. We suggest that the process of formulating 
and communicating these expectations to the sensory or motor 
areas which become activated prior to the realized event could, in 
turn, be summarized under the term anticipatory or preparatory 
processing. While this type of processing describes expectations 
formulated on short timescales, consideration of potential distant 
future events could be termed prospection. The term prediction 
has previously been used to describe both a single event expected 
within a certain context, and the overall process of postulating 
such “single predictions”. Given this ambiguity, the term prediction 
(predictive processing) could preferentially be used for describing 
the general orientation towards the future which includes a wide 
range of predictive phenomena, although in some contexts it may 
also serve as an appropriate synonym for expectation (Figure 1).
NATURE AND STRENGTH OF PREDICTION
In the previous paragraphs we have introduced the basic termi-
nology which describes different facets of predictive processing 
and indicated some inconsistencies in its usage. However, even 
if this terminology was to become more uniform and agreed 
upon, it would still not solve all existing problems in this area, as 
a more elaborate systematization which could account for differ-
ences between different levels, timescales or types (e.g., implicit 
and explicit) of predictions would still be lacking. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
nature and strength of predictions varies greatly in different con-
texts and may be inﬂ  uenced by different factors, e.g., the strength 
of the relationship between different events, frequency or context 
of their occurrence, etc. While in some situations expectations can 
be formulated in a rather unspeciﬁ  c manner and be restricted to 
a selected set of event features, e.g., sensory modality or location 
of an incoming stimulus, in others they may be very speciﬁ  c and 
pertain to the exact stimulus identity as well as the timing of its 
appearance. In addition, although a separation between implicit 
anticipations expressed through habits (behavior) and explicit ones 
which include representations of the predicted future states has 
been suggested (Pezzulo, 2008), it is still not clear whether these Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March  2010 | Volume  4 | Article  25 | 4
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should be considered as a dichotomy or if it would be more appro-
priate to posit a continuous distribution of representations charac-
terized by different degree of explicitness. Furthermore, prediction 
can take place on different temporal scales. First, expectations can 
be formulated based on the knowledge gained through long-term 
experience (Bar, 2007) or learning triggered by short-term exposure 
to non-random patterns (Schubotz, 2007). Second, it is possible to 
predict events which are expected to occur in different moments 
in the future, e.g., those expected to occur within seconds-range in 
contrast to those which may occur in the distant future. Long-term 
prediction is usually used “ofﬂ  ine” and is not necessarily coupled 
with any immediately relevant or running process in contrast to 
short-term prediction which is more likely to be used “online” for 
regulating the ongoing behavior, as exempliﬁ  ed in motor control 
where it is coupled to the current sensorimotor cycle (Pezzulo et al., 
2008). Consequently, prediction occurring on shorter timescales 
is typically more accurate when compared to long-term plan-
ning. In this context it is important to note that the timescale of 
prediction should not be confused with the concept of temporal 
expectations, namely a foresight of when something will occur 
(Nobre et al., 2007), which interact with expectations about other 
event properties in order to optimize our behavior. In addition, it 
is possible to generate multiple expectations pertaining to different 
points in space and time, as done in hierarchical predictive systems 
(Pezzulo et al., 2008) which capture the hierarchical organization 
of cognitive processes, the neural system and behavior (Dehaene 
and Changeux, 1997; Friston et al., 2006; Grafton and Hamilton, 
2007; Kiebel et al., 2008, 2009). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that multiple expectations pertaining to the same event occurring 
at one point in time may also be formulated across different brain 
systems. For example, Ritter et al. (1999) demonstrated how rare 
predictable tones may be classiﬁ  ed as violations of expectations 
at a preattentive, lower level of cognitive processing and, in the 
same time, as expected events at a higher level. Expectations of 
such different type and speciﬁ  city could be mediated through dif-
ferent mechanisms or, alternatively, be based on the same types 
of processes partially implemented within different brain regions. 
Understanding how such different types of predictions are coded 
in the brain will be crucial in understanding their mutual rela-
tions and potential interactions. In summary, in describing different 
aspects of prediction, it is always important to clearly specify as 
many features of such processing as possible. As indicated in this 
paragraph and Figure 2, there exist numerous factors which may 
be of relevance in this context. Although it may sometimes be dif-
ﬁ  cult to clearly specify all of them, it is nevertheless important to 
try, as this may substantially aid general understanding and future 
progress within the ﬁ  eld.
PREREQUISITES AND BENEFITS OF PREDICTION
Prerequisites of prediction
Events can be predictable if they occur in a non-random fashion, 
allowing the brain to extract either deterministic or probabilistic 
regularity of the relationship between different events. This knowl-
edge can later be used for predicting the occurrences of some events 
following the presentation of those customarily preceding them. It 
is important to note that this statement describes only situations 
which afford predictability and does not say anything about how 
the brain deals with completely novel or random input. Although 
such contexts do not promote predictive processing directly, there 
is evidence which suggests that the brain may still employ similar 
predictive strategies in an attempt to extract a pattern within the 
random input (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2002a; Schubotz, 2004) 
FIGURE 1 | Basic terms that describe different aspects of a general orientation 
towards the future. When presented with a sequence of regularly alternating 
numbers “1” and “2” , we soon start expecting that a number “2” should occur 
after the number “1” , a process which results in a speciﬁ  c anticipatory activation of 
the sensory as well as motor cortex. The representation of the speciﬁ  c expected 
event can, in turn, be termed expectation. While this type of a process occurs on a 
short timescale, prospection describes the formulation of rather long-term 
expectations which do not necessarily lead to speciﬁ  c sensory or motor pre-
activations, e.g., when a participant in an experiment foresees to receive a 
payment after the experimental session. Although all these terms describe 
somewhat different phenomena, they may all be considered as speciﬁ  c aspects of 
a common directedness towards the future which may be termed prediction.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March  2010 | Volume  4 | Article  25 | 5
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or relate the novel input to familiar knowledge by generating analo-
gies, thus facilitating the processing of new stimuli (Bar, 2007). On 
the other hand, predictions generated in non-random contexts may 
be based on learning and identifying associations, especially tem-
poral dependencies between events (Butz et al., 2003; Bar, 2007). 
This can be accomplished by accumulating information related to 
statistical regularities while dealing with constant noise and uncer-
tainty in the environment (Kording and Wolpert, 2006), as well 
as applying inference rules or deducing analogies between events 
(Pezzulo et al., 2008; Bar, 2009). Within the perceptual domain, 
rules (i.e., regular relations between events) of different complex-
ity may afford predictability of the incoming stimuli. For example, 
concrete (so-called ﬁ  rst-order) rules deﬁ  ned by constant repetition 
of a stimulus (or a stimulus feature) can trigger an expectation 
about the continuation of its appearance in the future (Squires 
et al., 1976). On the other hand, second-order or even higher-order 
(contingency) rules (Näätanen et al., 2001; Shanks, 2007) which 
require the extraction of relations between speciﬁ  c, mutually non-
interchangeable stimuli can underlie expectations related to more 
complex events, even those which were previously not encountered 
within the respective context.
One special instance in which the knowledge about the tem-
poral structure of incoming events can be used for predicting 
upcoming events is serial order processing (serial pattern learn-
ing, sequence processing or sequencing) across different domains. 
Such processing may also differ in its complexity, allowing one to 
distinguish between simple linear (ﬂ  at) sequences based on learn-
ing local dependencies between neighboring items and non-linear 
(hierarchical) sequences deﬁ  ned by long-distance dependencies 
(Conway and Christiansen, 2001; Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Bapi 
et al., 2005; Opitz and Friederici, 2007). Although most prominent 
in the language and the motor domain (Cohen et al., 1990; Tanji 
and Shima, 1994; Clegg et al., 1998; Keele et al., 2003; Ashe et al., 
2006), serial order processing has also been studied in the con-
text of artiﬁ  cial grammar learning (Reber, 1967; Cleeremans and 
McClelland, 1991; Bahlmann et al., 2008), music (Pfordresher et al., 
2007), perception (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2001a; Remillard, 
2003; Hoen et al., 2006) and executive functions (Koechlin et al., 
2000; Jubault et al., 2007). These domains are comparable as they 
all require ordinal processing of different information types and 
may share not only functional commonalities, but partly also the 
underlying neural substrate (Lelekov-Boissard and Dominey, 2002; 
Janata and Grafton, 2003; Patel, 2003; Fiebach and Schubotz, 2006; 
Jubault et al., 2007; Opitz and Friederici, 2007). And, although all 
of them can greatly beneﬁ  t from predictive processing, the level of 
anticipation afforded in them may depend on the type of acquired 
sequence knowledge. Speciﬁ  cally, Willingham et al. (1989) showed 
that, in comparison to implicit, the explicit knowledge is more 
likely to allow participants to predict the upcoming stimulus before 
it appears.
While the majority of previous examples indicate how tempo-
ral structure of incoming events affords predictability, spatial or 
more abstract relations between events can also become important 
sources of predictions. Such relations can be conceptualized as 
context frames, namely contextual structures which provide sets 
of expectations about the identity of stimuli and thus facilitate 
perception and action (Bar, 2004; Fenske et al., 2006). More elabo-
rate long-term predictions or simulations of the future can, on the 
other hand, be based on recombinations of past events and con-
crete episodes contained within the individuals’ episodic memory 
(Schacter et al., 2007) and used for creating “memories for the 
future” (Ingvar, 1985).
Beneﬁ  ts of prediction
As previously mentioned, the beneﬁ  ts of preparation have been 
recognized very early both in the motor and the perceptual domain. 
Behavioral experiments conducted by Wundt showed that attention 
and expectations related to the upcoming stimulus can shorten 
perception time, while Lange demonstrated beneﬁ  cial behavioral 
effects following the correct anticipation of a response (LaBerge, 
1995). Ever since the 19th century, more and more advantages of 
predictive in contrast to pure reactive processing have been pos-
tulated. Llinas (2002) argued that predictions identiﬁ  ed at differ-
ent levels of processing save resources and allow the perceiver to 
prepare the appropriate reactions. They can lead to faster recogni-
tion and interpretation of events encountered in the environment 
(Bar, 2007) by limiting the repertoire of potential responses to 
such events. Given that the information relevant for planning and 
executing appropriate reactions are available sooner, measurable 
beneﬁ  ts of anticipatory processing include an increase in accuracy, 
speed or maintenance of information processing (LaBerge, 1995). 
In addition, expectations allow us to construct a coherent and stable 
representation of the environment which is usually not easy, given 
the available, often impoverished (noisy and delayed) informa-
tion (Kveraga et al., 2007a). Moreover, they may guide top-down 
deployment of attention, improve information seeking as well as 
FIGURE 2 | Main factors which specify the nature of predictive processes 
across different contexts. It is important to note that these do not represent 
mutually independent and orthogonal dimensions, but may in some contexts 
strongly overlap and interact. Furthermore, some additional features such as, e.g., 
type of information used for formulating expectations, might also be of relevance 
when specifying the exact nature of the predictive phenomenon of interest.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March  2010 | Volume  4 | Article  25 | 6
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subsequent decision making (Butz and Pezzulo, 2008). Thus, in 
a way, prediction allows us to act, and not solely react to events 
occurring around us.
On a more general functional and behavioral level, the ideomo-
tor principle suggested that anticipated sensory consequences of 
one’s actions can trigger and guide behavior (Hommel et al., 2001), 
which has been supported by studies showing that representations 
of events or actions include the anticipated effects of those events 
as well as intentions behind the actions (Kerzel et al., 2000; Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). Thus, Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007) 
suggested that both perception and production of such events rely 
on prospective codes which incorporate information about their 
future states. Kunde et al. (2007) similarly argued that anticipation 
constitutes a necessary prerequisite for action because any action or 
response needs to start with a response-related anticipation. In this 
view, voluntary behavior in general is initiated and controlled by a 
representation of its expected outcomes (Hoffmann et al., 2007), 
illustrating how anticipation lies in the foundations of goal-directed 
behavior (Pezzulo, 2008). The initiation of such behavior could 
additionally be facilitated by simulations of the expected emotional 
consequences of actions (premotions) which can also be used as a 
basis for additional predictions (Gilbert and Wilson, 2009).
IMPORTANCE OF PREDICTION ACROSS NEUROCOGNITIVE DOMAINS
All of the previously described beneﬁ  ts of prediction indirectly 
suggest that this type of processing could be useful for numerous 
cognitive domains and functions. Such a suggestion even has some 
common sense validity: for example, one does not enter a car to 
drive many miles because one is hungry, but because one is hungry 
and expects to ﬁ  nd food in a restaurant which can be reached using 
a car. Therefore, not surprisingly, the fact that we are constantly ori-
ented towards the future, that we formulate intentions and plan our 
future actions has been acknowledged and widely studied within 
the ﬁ  elds of, e.g., planning or prospective memory (Winograd, 
1988; Friedman and Scholnick, 1997; Morris and Ward, 2005). In 
recent years, however, a more elaborate view according to which 
prediction or anticipation represents a fundamental principle of 
brain functioning which is “at the core of cognition” (Pezzulo et al., 
2007, p. 68) has emerged. Illustrating its importance, the anticipa-
tory nature of many cognitive functions and neural systems, such 
as motor control (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001), motor imagery 
and action understanding (Jeannerod, 2001; Kilner et al., 2007), 
visual processing and attention (Mehta and Schaal, 2002; Enns 
and Lleras, 2008), language (DeLong et al., 2005), music (Keller 
and Koch, 2008), emotional processing (Ueda et al., 2003; Nitschke 
et al., 2006; Herwig et al., 2007; Gilbert and Wilson, 2009), execu-
tive functions (Partiot et al., 1995; Baker et al., 1996; Fuster, 2001; 
Wylie et al., 2006), and the theory of mind (Frith and Frith, 2006) 
has been suggested and experimentally demonstrated.
However, although predictive accounts of many functions have 
been posited and are currently well accepted, it is not always easy to 
show that it is indeed predictive processing which underlies a cer-
tain phenomenon. For example, some aspects of two phenomena 
which are typically considered as representative cases of prediction 
in vision, namely representational momentum (Kerzel, 2005) and 
the ﬂ  ash-lag effect (Nijhawan, 1997), could also be explained by 
retrospective processing (Whitney and Murakami, 1998; Eagleman 
and Sejnowski, 2000; Enns and Lleras, 2008). Furthermore, it has 
been shown that the visual extrapolation of the moving object’s 
position in the ﬂ  ash-lag effect seems to occur at a stage when 
visual input is transformed into information needed for motor 
response, and not during early stages of visual processing (Kerzel 
and Gegenfurtner, 2003). In addition, it is important to recog-
nize that prediction in visual perception is often discussed on two 
different levels. On the one hand, according to the more literate 
meaning of the concept, predictive processing refers to modulations 
of brain activity prior to the actual presentation of the stimulus 
triggered by, e.g., instruction (Carlsson et al., 2000), speciﬁ  c task 
cue (Simmons et al., 2004), prior presentation of a stimulus which 
had become associated with the target stimulus through short-term 
learning within the same (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2001b) or a 
different (Widmann et al., 2007) modality, as well as prior presenta-
tion of objects which are long-term, e.g., semantically or contextu-
ally, related to the target event (Kveraga et al., 2007b). However, 
the term predictive processing is also used to describe top-down 
predictions which are initialized after stimulus presentation, thus 
constituting the activate-predict-conﬁ  rm perceptive cycle (Enns 
and Lleras, 2008). These expectations are based on some features 
of the presented stimulus, e.g., low spatial frequencies, which get 
processed fast and become the basis for formulating predictions 
about the objects’ more speciﬁ  c properties which are processed 
slower (Kveraga et al., 2007a,b). All of these examples indicate that 
even within speciﬁ  c cognitive domains, predictive processing comes 
in different ﬂ  avors and may be very difﬁ  cult to capture if not all 
factors underlying its speciﬁ  c occurrence are accounted for.
In an attempt to deﬁ  ne unifying mechanisms across different 
systems, simulation theories of cognition have emphasized the 
role of internal simulations or emulations not just within one, but 
across many different cognitive domains, arguing that these can 
mostly be reduced to covert simulations based on internal mod-
els (Hesslow, 2002; Grush, 2004). A crucial representational status 
with respect to such simulation processes, especially with respect to 
different aspects of social cognition, e.g., action understanding or 
language, has been proposed for the so-called “mirror neuron sys-
tem” (Gallese, 2007). Although potentially appealing, many of such 
large-scale interpretations which incorporate a wide range of cogni-
tive functions are still somewhat underspeciﬁ  ed with respect to the 
mechanisms and neural architecture underlying different types of 
processes. In addition, even the terminology which these endorse 
is still not used in a systematic fashion. For example, simulations 
and emulations have previously been differentiated with respect 
to the type of phenomenon (goals and/or algorithms used by the 
original process) (Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009) or process (related 
to body or the environment) (Poirier and Hardy-Vallee, 2005) they 
mimic, as well as brain regions and networks they engage (Grush, 
2004). Furthermore, simulations based on internal models which 
are assumed to incorporate all details related to the mimicked events 
should not be confused with those which underlie general forecast-
ing of (distant) future events (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). While 
the ﬁ  rst type of simulations might be implemented in the motor 
system and used, for example, for understanding the actions of 
others (Jeannerod, 2001), the latter is based on a somewhat ﬂ  exible 
recombination of past episodes and primarily relies on processing 
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On a comparable scale of relevance, but much more com-
putationally speciﬁ  ed, Friston (2005) proposed a pivotal role of 
expectations across different levels of neural processing: not only 
is the common code of brain functioning a predictive one, but 
our predictions act as a form of self-fulﬁ  lling prophecy. According 
to this view, predictive processing is inherent to all levels of our 
hierarchically organized neural system. In addition, predictions 
are suggested to drive our perception, cognition and behavior in 
a sense that we do not only passively match expected to incoming 
events and objectively evaluate the accuracy of our expectations, 
but actively try to fulﬁ  ll those predictions by preferentially sam-
pling corresponding features in the environment. This implies 
that the suggested impact of predictions may also be disadvanta-
geous as these may constrain our processing and behavior, always 
keeping us within the limits deﬁ  ned by our previous experiences. 
If true, this might suggest that a more reactive strategy based on 
detailed consideration of all incoming information might quali-
tatively be more advantageous. However, it has been suggested 
that this is not the case (Friston and Stephan, 2007). Furthermore, 
exploration and novelty have rewarding properties of their own 
(Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Knutson and Cooper, 2006) which may 
result in balancing between exploratory and exploitative behavior 
across different contexts. In summary, it is becoming more and 
more clear that anticipation and expectations do not just represent 
isolated phenomena, but one of the main unitary principles of 
cognition characteristic not just for humans but also animals, e.g., 
dogs, snakes or insects (Roitblat and Scopatz, 1983; Rainer et al., 
1999; Webb, 2004). This may justify recent claims according to 
which the mind itself can be conceived of as an anticipatory device 
(Pezzulo et al., 2007). As described in more detail in the Section 
“Introduction,” such conceptualization is far from behaviorist 
stimulus–response models of human behavior or later cognitiv-
ist metaphors of the mind as a computer, namely a highly efﬁ  cient, 
primarily feedforward processing machine.
MECHANISMS OF PREDICTION
Anticipatory or predictive processing is directed towards the future 
and, at the same time, highly dependent and grounded in the infor-
mation from the past. This bridging over different temporal points 
and taking advantage of the past in order to improve behavior in 
the future is suggested to be the core capacity which makes our 
cognitive brain so efﬁ  cient (Kveraga et al., 2007a). Given that pre-
diction is inherent to many different levels and types of processes, 
it is not easy to identify common neural mechanisms supporting 
such processing across all contexts. While some of these effects 
could be mediated in a somewhat indirect manner through changes 
in alertness and attention (Brunia, 1999), most of them should 
be considered direct. Speciﬁ  cally, prediction is associated with a 
wide range of neural phenomena within different brain networks, 
e.g., changes of neuronal threshold in sensory cortices (Gomez 
et al., 2004), long-range phase synchronization (Gross et al., 2006), 
changes in connectivity across brain regions (O’Reilly et al., 2008) 
or existence of preparatory-set cells in the prefrontal or parietal cor-
tex (Quintana and Fuster, 1992). Generally, as will be shown in the 
following sections, predictive processing has been related to almost 
all brain regions and networks. Such results should not be surpris-
ing, given the wide range of contexts which afford predictions.
Sources and sites of predictions in perception
One way to understand predictive processing in perception is to 
conceptualize anticipation as a bias signal (Rees and Frith, 1998) 
which improves the computational efﬁ  ciency of a speciﬁ  c area. 
This description may be useful, as it points to three elements which 
need to be speciﬁ  ed in order to understand such a phenomenon: 
brain regions which formulate expectations and impose such a 
bias (sources), regions which are inﬂ  uenced by it (sites) and a 
communication mode mediating this process. Within sites of 
prediction such as, e.g., relevant sensory cortices, modulations of 
activity occurring in expectation of a stimulus include a reduc-
tion of activation threshold and an increase in signal-to-noise ratio 
which facilitates subsequent stimulus processing (Brunia, 1999; 
Gomez et al., 2004). These effects are reﬂ  ected in the elicitation of 
particular event-related anticipatory components, e.g., contingent 
negative variation, stimulus preceding negativity or the readiness 
potential (Brunia, 1999; Praamstra et al., 2006) and the suppres-
sion of speciﬁ  c brain rhythms in the sensory cortices (event-related 
desynchronization; ERD) as measured using electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG) (Bastiaansen and Brunia, 2001). Evidence for the claim 
that improved speed and accuracy of processing expected stimuli 
reﬂ  ects preparatory effects in the relevant sensory cortices poten-
tially coupled with the inhibitory effects in other sensory modali-
ties (Brunia, 1999) comes from studies which show comparable 
patterns of activity in stimulus perception and anticipation. For 
example, ﬁ  ndings showing that actual somatosensory stimulation 
and anticipation of such stimulation engage the same network 
(Carlsson et al., 2000) suggest a top-down modulated pre-activa-
tion of sensory cortex waiting for the stimulus to occur. A simi-
lar pre-activation of areas involved in processing relevant events 
has been show in other domains, e.g., emotion or pain processing 
(Porro et al., 2002; Ueda et al., 2003), although not consistently 
(Bermpohl et al., 2006).
In addition to understanding preparatory effects in relevant sen-
sory cortices, it is important to describe how these effects are initi-
ated and controlled. In an attempt to answer this question, Gomez 
et al. (2004) suggested that frontomedial cortical areas, namely the 
supplementary motor area and anterior cingulate cortex, represent 
the best candidate areas responsible for initiating the process of 
preparing for perception (and action) by recruiting speciﬁ  c sen-
sory (and motor) cortices needed for subsequent processing. An 
important role of orbitofrontal as well as medial prefrontal cortex 
in formulating expectations about incoming visual objects which 
is crucial for object recognition has also been suggested by Kveraga 
et al. (2007b) and Summerﬁ  eld et al. (2006). On the other hand, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was hypothesized to be implicated 
in sustaining the activation of the sensory (and motor) cortices 
(Gomez et al., 2004). Similarly, Brunia (1999) suggested a crucial 
role of prefrontal cortex in organizing anticipatory behavior by 
activating cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical loops to sensory 
(and motor) areas after the preparatory set had been established. 
Once formed, the preparatory set could be communicated through 
changes in brain’s oscillatory activity, speciﬁ  cally increases in phase 
synchronization of neuronal populations in executive areas trigger-
ing the increased effective synaptic gain of neurons in target sen-
sory population (Engel et al., 2001). Along these lines, Liang et al. 
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during anticipation of a visual stimulus predicts characteristics of 
early visual processing and behavioral response. Therefore, these 
authors argued that synchronized oscillations in prefrontal cortex 
represent a plausible candidate for sustaining visual anticipation, 
proposing that such anticipatory control develops as a consequence 
of accumulating prior experience.
Everything previously mentioned within this section suggests 
that one useful way of conceptualizing predictive processing in 
perception may include distinguishing between “sources” which 
formulate expectations and “sites” to which these are then com-
municated. And, although this distinction may generally prove to 
be useful, it may not always be easy to incorporate. For example, it 
is by now well established that predictive processing is not a phe-
nomenon restricted to two levels of brain processing (one source 
and one site), but one which occurs across multiple levels of hier-
archy. According to the predictive coding model, visual process-
ing can be described as an integration of top-down expectations 
and bottom-up stimulus information occurring across multiple 
levels within a hierarchical architecture (Rao and Ballard, 1999; 
Friston, 2005; Friston and Kiebel, 2009). In this view, top-down 
expectancy biases are communicated through cortical feedback 
connections, while feedforward ones convey error signals which 
indicate the goodness-of-ﬁ  t of predictions and incoming stimulus 
information, namely the difference (residual error) between top-
down and bottom-up signals. While the importance of prediction 
errors in this framework will be described in the later sections, at 
this point it is important to notice that most levels within such a 
hierarchy can be considered as both sources and sites of predictions. 
Furthermore, it is not always so that high-level associative areas have 
to be responsible for generating predictions about the incoming 
input. As indicated by research related to the auditory mismatch 
negativity event-related component, predictions generated by rep-
resentations of rules could also be formulated within a sensory, in 
this case auditory, system itself (Schröger, 2007; Winkler, 2007).
Internal models mediate prediction across many domains
In addition to the general account presented above, more speciﬁ  c 
suggestions emphasizing a crucial role of certain systems and 
regions of the brain, primarily the motor system and especially 
the cerebellum (Jeannerod, 2001; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; 
Wolpert et  al., 2003; Schubotz, 2007), in predictive processing 
have also been proposed. Functionally, it has been suggested that 
the prediction of future states of the body or the environment 
arises from mimicking their respective dynamics through the use of 
internal models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Wolpert et al., 1995; Grush, 
2004). The internal model approach was originally developed in 
the motor domain where it went beyond explaining the release 
of motor commands acting on the musculoskeletal system and 
introduced another level of computations which essentially entail 
internal simulations of different aspects of sensorimotor  processing 
(Wolpert et al., 2003) accomplished by internal models. The initial 
development of the internal model framework was motivated by 
demonstrations from the experimental work of Sperry, who pro-
posed that a corollary discharge from an action command modu-
lates the visual perception of movement (Sperry, 1950), as well 
as from von Holst and Mittelstaedt who ﬁ  rst described how the 
discrimination of self- produced and externally applied stimuli may 
occur through the interaction between sensory feedback signals 
following an action and an efference copy of the action command 
(von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Although addressing somewhat 
different issues and introducing different terminology, these two 
ﬁ  ndings were the ﬁ  rst to demonstrate how the system predicts self-
generated sensory signals, an idea which has been greatly pursued 
in the last decades within the framework of internal models. These 
models simulate the dynamics of the motor system in order to, in 
case of inverse models, deduce the motor command which lead to a 
certain outcome or, in case of forward models, predict the expected 
sensory consequences of the executed movement (Wolpert and 
Miall, 1996). The predictive process is initiated by a copy of the 
motor command, i.e., an efference copy, while the term corollary 
discharge is typically used to describe the output of the predic-
tor, namely the expected sensory consequences of the produced 
action. In this context, it has been experimentally demonstrated 
that expected sensory consequences of self-generated movements 
get processed in an attenuated fashion both in the auditory and the 
somatosensory domain (Martikainen et al., 2005; Bäß et al., 2009; 
Hesse et al., 2010). In contrast, sensory outcomes of self- generated 
actions which violate expectations formulated based on motor sig-
nals elicit deviance-related event-related potentials of the EEG and 
cause behavioral delay (Waszak and Herwig, 2007; Iwanaga and 
Nittono, 2010), indicating that they are processed as deviant events. 
Importantly, although these effects occur as responses to violations 
related to different types of movements, it has recently been dem-
onstrated that they are especially accentuated in cases of voluntary 
actions (Nittono, 2006; Adachi et al., 2007). On a more general 
level, it has been demonstrated that internal models are, in essence, 
predictive (Bays et al., 2006) and, in addition to distinguishing 
between self-generated and externally produced movements, may 
be used to estimate the current or predict the future state of the 
system (Miall and Wolpert, 1996) as well as estimate more general 
context variables (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). Computationally, 
the expectations formulized within the internal models could be 
optimized in a Bayesian fashion, through weighted combinations 
of priors and sensory likelihoods (Kording and Wolpert, 2006) 
and subsequently evaluated through a comparison with the actual 
sensory input available after the movement (Figure 3).
Although the internal model framework has originally been 
developed within the motor domain, it has in recent decades proved 
to be useful for explaining different phenomena well beyond this 
ﬁ  eld. For example, it was recognized rather early that one class of 
forward models can mimic or approximate some aspects of the 
environment using the collected sensory knowledge such as, e.g., 
a trajectory of an already moving object, for predicting its future 
behavior (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). 
In a similar fashion, initially motivated by ﬁ  ndings implicating the 
motor system in some forms of perceptual processing (Schubotz 
and von Cramon, 2002a,b,c, 2003), Schubotz and von Cramon 
(2003) suggested a joint, so-called sensorimotor forward model, 
account unifying the perceptual and motor domain. In this view, 
prediction underlies both motor and perceptual processes in which 
the brain can emulate expected events, regardless of whether these 
constitute sensory consequences of one’s own actions or expected 
sensory stimuli. Such emulation is enabled by the creation of 
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can be exploited for making predictions about future states of the 
modeled space, be that the body or the environment (Schubotz, 
2007). Although suggesting that the prediction of both internal 
and external events can be supported through highly comparable 
computations implemented within the motor system, this view does 
not automatically assume that the models supporting perceptual 
and motor processing should be completely identical. While motor 
processing requires development of highly accurate and precise 
models (Blakemore et al., 1998; Miall, 2003), in perception such 
high precision may be either unnecessary since accurate predic-
tion can often rely only on relational properties of external events, 
or even disadvantageous because it occurs in a noisy system and 
environment. This suggestion is in line with the hyper-MOSAIC 
model (Wolpert et al., 2003) which proposes an architecture con-
taining several levels of forward models differing in the level of 
speciﬁ  city and function, thus providing a general framework for 
understanding prediction in a wide range or high level cognitive 
functions including action observation, imitation, mental practice, 
social interaction and the theory of mind.
The brain as a prediction device
In the previous sections different parts of the brain have been 
associated with predictive processing, speciﬁ  cally different sensory 
cortices, the thalamus, the prefrontal cortex and the motor system. 
These sections described only a subset of contexts which afford 
predictability, most of which were limited to short timescales. In 
addition, it is important to mention that a pivotal role in prediction 
on longer timescales can be associated with the prefrontal cortex 
which is, together with medial temporal regions, especially the 
hippocampus (Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2009; Lisman and Redish, 
2009), and posterior cerebral cortices (including the lateral parietal 
and temporal regions, the precuneus and the retrosplenial cortex), 
crucial for imagining the future as well as remembering the past 
(Schacter et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2009). However, although 
this region is also typically considered as the key region implicated 
in planning (Fuster, 1997), the contributions of the parietal cortices 
should also be acknowledged in this context (Ruby et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, a more central role of lateral parietal, together with 
premotor regions can be posited for formulating temporal expec-
tations (Coull and Nobre, 2008; Coull, 2009). In addition, it is 
important to mention other brain regions which have been associ-
ated with predictive processing, e.g., the basal ganglia (Schultz and 
Dickinson, 2000; Flesischer, 2007; Kotz et al., 2009) and especially 
the ventral striatum in reward prediction (Knutson and Cooper, 
2005) or amygdala, insula and the anterior cingulate cortex in pain 
or emotional processing (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Porro et al., 2003; 
Ueda et al., 2003). Not questioning the validity of these or accounts 
previously speciﬁ  ed, it is still important to note one danger which 
can be associated with considering all of these accounts together, 
without clearly specifying the type of predictive processing they 
refer to. Speciﬁ  cally, if one was to try and summarize all brain areas 
which have so far been mentioned as incorporating some aspect 
of predictive processing, these would include: unimodal sensory 
cortices, lateral and medial parietal and temporal areas, orbitof-
rontal, medial frontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, premotor 
cortex, insula, cerebellum, basal ganglia, amygdala and thalamus 
(Figure 4). In other words, the whole brain. And, while it may be 
true that different aspects of prediction can be captured across the 
whole brain or nervous system itself, it does not imply that they 
share an equivalent role.
In summary, there are different ways of conceptualizing and 
differentiating the role of different brain areas in prediction. One 
way is to differentiate between sources and sites of predictions, as 
shown in the example of perception. In this view, higher-level areas 
such as lateral, medial, orbital prefrontal and premotor regions 
could be considered as sources which formulate expectations and 
communicate them to lower-level, typically sensory areas. However, 
as previously elaborated, this view can only be considered as a very 
rough simpliﬁ  cation. Furthermore, it may be useful to consider 
numerous dimensions which have previously been discussed and 
suggested to be relevant in deﬁ  ning the nature of predictive phe-
nomena. This includes, for example, the timescale of prediction, as 
some regions may be more relevant for short-term, e.g., the premo-
tor cortex, in contrast to others which are important for predic-
tion across different timescales, such as, e.g., the prefrontal cortex. 
In addition, the cognitive domain, e.g., emotional, perceptual or 
FIGURE 3 | Prediction in motor control. Based on the efference copy of the motor command, a forward model is formulated and used for predicting the 
consequences of one’s own actions. These predictions are compared with the incoming sensory input which can result either in a “match” in case predictions were 
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motor, or the nature of predicted features, e.g., object identity or the 
context within which it is usually encountered, can be considered 
as crucial in determining the sources within which such expecta-
tions are formulated. An alternative way of determining which levels 
and types of predictions are associated with certain brain areas is 
to specify more holistic models. Previously described predictive 
coding model can be viewed as such. Within this framework the 
brain is seen as a “Bayesian inference machine”, constantly build-
ing models of the environment and the body, allowing the brain 
to predict their respective future states (Knill and Pouget, 2004; 
Friston and Stephan, 2007). Importantly, such general nature of 
brain processing can then account for many phenomena across 
domains and processes, e.g., perception, attention, action or learn-
ing (Friston, 2005; Friston and Stephan, 2007). An important aspect 
of this and other models of prediction relates to testing the validity 
of posited expectations by comparing them to the realized events. 
Potential outcomes of such testing will be described in the follow-
ing section.
WHEN PREDICTIONS MEET REALITY
Although the process of formulating expectations is interesting 
in its own right, it is also quite fascinating to consider what hap-
pens once the external event occurs, especially in cases where it 
does not meet the initial expectations. In the previous sections it 
was suggested that expected stimuli (matches) are processed in a 
more efﬁ  cient manner than the unexpected ones (mismatches), 
as indicated by more accurate and faster reactions to these events. 
However, efﬁ  ciency should not be confused with relevance or asso-
ciated priority. On the contrary, given that these represent pure 
conﬁ  rmations of correctly formulated expectations and signal 
correct learning, matches carry little informational value and are 
therefore not relevant for the system. Consequently, an expected 
event does not need to be explicitly represented or communicated 
to higher cortical areas which have processed all of its relevant fea-
tures prior to its occurrence. In contrast, errors of prediction have 
much greater value (Friston and Stephan, 2007), as they may signal 
unsuccessful learning, a major change in the surroundings or noise 
and smaller changes in the body or the environment, correspond-
ing to normal (plant or world) drifts which typically occur over 
time (Grush, 2004). Therefore, registering and further processing 
events which deviate from predictions is important, but “costly” 
as they draw attentional resources needed in order to check their 
behavioral relevance (Corbetta et al., 2002) which will determine 
their subsequent treatment. For example, errors of prediction which 
are irrelevant for the current mental set or reﬂ  ect noise in the envi-
ronment can be registered and ignored, allowing the individual to 
reorient himself to the task at hand (Escera et al., 2000; Corbetta 
et al., 2002). However, when these are relevant and informative, e.g., 
in situations where one fails to learn the relevant contingencies or 
the environment suddenly changes, they can trigger an update of 
one’s knowledge (Winkler et al., 1996; Winkler and Czigler, 1998) 
and behavioral adaptations. Therefore, the cost associated with 
processing these events may in the end turn to be beneﬁ  cial, as 
it can lead to an adaptive reaction to the changing environment. 
Such signiﬁ  cance of deviant events for cognitive processing and 
behavior is reﬂ  ected on the level of our nervous system which is 
highly sensitive to novel events, changes in the environment and 
other types of errors in prediction (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; 
Friston et al., 2006).
Importantly, not only are novel or unexpected events prefer-
entially detected, but also encoded, as demonstrated by the iden-
tiﬁ  ed novelty advantage in memory (Knight and Nakada, 1998; 
Kishiyama et al., 2009). This may explain why prediction errors 
or the discrepancies between expected and realized events have 
FIGURE 4 | The predictive brain. Numerous brain areas and networks have 
previously been associated with some aspect of prediction, thus illustrating the 
notion of the “predictive brain” . It is important to note that this outline is 
simpliﬁ  ed as it lacks both anatomical and functional speciﬁ  city. Nevertheless, it 
may be useful as an illustration and an invitation to further elaborate speciﬁ  c 
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been postulated as one of the main learning forces. Speciﬁ  cally, 
associative learning theories (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Schultz 
et al., 1997) describe how taking into account differences between 
the predicted and actual outcomes promotes learning and postulate 
how the size of the prediction error affects the rate of forming asso-
ciations between events. At the neuronal level, these discrepancies 
can be translated into changes in synaptic weights using speciﬁ  c 
learning computational rules, leading to changes in the model 
and subsequent more accurate predictions (Wolpert et al., 2003). 
Neurons in different brain structures have been shown to code 
prediction errors stemming from different sources, e.g., rewards, 
punishment, external stimuli and own behavior, a process which 
in some contexts may be mediated through the dopaminergic and 
norepinergic pathways (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). In addi-
tion to this direct link between prediction errors and learning, a 
somewhat more indirect one may be mediated through increased 
attentional resources being diverted towards the perceived predic-
tion error (Wills et al., 2007) or their high emotional signiﬁ  cance 
(Frey et al., 2009). On a somewhat different note, although it has 
previously been suggested that errors in behavior could be organ-
ized hierarchically (Krigolson and Holroyd, 2007), it is not clear 
what such hierarchical structure includes and whether different 
levels of hierarchy may somehow interact. Interestingly, it has also 
been shown that the detection of semantic violations in language 
might be somehow restricted by the processing of syntactic struc-
ture (Friederici et al., 1999) and that different types of deviants in 
visual sequences may be processed through different mechanisms 
(Koester and Prinz, 2007). This line of research comparing and 
mutually relating different types and sources of errors will surely 
become more and more important in the future as it may reveal 
interesting and important insights about both regular and violated 
predictive processing within and across different contexts.
The question of how errors of prediction are processed online 
relates strongly to the general issue of the integration of top-down 
and bottom-up information which has been posited to rely on 
error-minimalization mechanisms (Grossberg, 1980; Mumford, 
1992; Ullman, 1995; Friston, 2005; Kveraga et al., 2007b). According 
to the predictive view, expectations mediated through feedback 
connections represent top-down information which are compared 
and integrated with bottom-up signals communicated through 
feedforward connections, a process accomplished through speciﬁ  c 
synchronization patterns visible across different levels of the hierar-
chy (Kveraga et al., 2007b) and changes in connectivity between rel-
evant regions (den Ouden et al., 2009). It has already been described 
that mismatches which are detected through such a comparison 
elicit more pronounced responses which get communicated to the 
next level in the hierarchy using feedforward connections. The 
size of such mismatches (prediction error) is suggested to reﬂ  ect 
surprise which the brain tries to minimize in order to maintain 
present and future stability (Friston and Stephan, 2007). In contrast, 
matches produce non-salient responses and their overall processing 
is suppressed. In this view, postulated predictions act as a form of 
perceptual ﬁ  lter, as their accuracy determines which information is 
suppressed at an earlier processing stage (match) and what is com-
municated to a higher level (mismatch). It has been suggested that 
this conceptualization may be incompatible with current theories of 
attention which posit an enhancement of stimulus-driven activity 
that it is consistent with top-down bias communicated through 
feedback connections (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Summerﬁ  eld 
and Egner, 2009). However, it has recently been demonstrated that 
this may not be the case, as the predictive coding model can be 
considered mathematically equivalent with a particular form of 
biased competition model of attention (Spratling, 2008a,b).
It is plausible to expect that the near future will being a formula-
tion of an unifying framework bridging seemingly contradictory 
attentional and predictive phenomena, given that both of these 
reﬂ  ect comparable processing biases implemented within the same 
hierarchical brain architecture. An additional open issue concerns 
the differences in dynamics of processing events which conﬁ  rm 
and violate previous expectations. Although it was previously 
mentioned that more elaborate processing should follow the pres-
entation of mismatches, Summerﬁ  eld and Koechlin (2008) have 
suggested a more reﬁ  ned hypothesis according to which match-sup-
pression should occur in lower-level hierarchical areas in contrast 
to match-enhancement which is to be expected in higher-level 
regions. In accordance with this, these authors demonstrated how 
processing expected stimuli preferentially engages ventral prefron-
tal and orbitofrontal cortex (Summerﬁ  eld and Koechlin, 2008). 
However, the importance of these regions has previously been iden-
tiﬁ  ed in the completely opposite context of detecting violations of 
expectations (Nobre et al., 1999; Petersson et al., 2004; Petrides, 
2007), leaving this issue to be settled in the future. And, although 
it has been suggested that the search of representation (predic-
tion/match relevant) and error (mismatch signaling) neurons will 
be an important challenge for the future (Summerﬁ  eld and Egner, 
2009), it is still not clear whether error-codes signaling a breach 
of expectations necessarily have to be implemented within single 
neurons, or if such signals could be implemented within dendrites 
of certain neuronal populations (Spratling, 2008b). In addition to 
identifying neural regions which preferentially process matches 
and mismatches, future research may beneﬁ  t from investigating 
neural synchrony between relevant cortical regions across different 
levels of hierarchy (Kveraga et al., 2007b) as a potential comple-
mentary signature of (un)successful matching between top-down 
and   bottom-up information. Clearly, much more research will be 
needed in order to clarify these issues.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, anticipatory or predictive processing potentially 
reﬂ  ects one of the core, fundamental principles of brain function-
ing which justiﬁ  es the notion of “the predictive brain”. Even if this 
statement is too strong, the relevance of prediction in cognitive and 
neural processing can still not be overestimated. Prediction allows 
us to direct our behavior towards the future, while remaining well-
grounded and guided by the information pertaining to the present 
and the past. Furthermore, predictive processing represents one 
of the key features of many cognitive functions and is mediated 
through a wide selection of mechanisms expressed in numerous 
cortical and subcortical levels. Such beneﬁ  ts are widely acknowl-
edged and have in recent years been greatly investigated.
However, although a lot is known about this type of processing, 
numerous open questions remain. Many of these can be identiﬁ  ed 
with respect to each speciﬁ  c account or model incorporating or pos-
iting predictive mechanisms. Even more importantly, it seems even Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 25  |  12
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